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Abstract—Timely detection of Hardware Trojans (HT) has be-
come a major challenge for secure integrated circuits. We present
a run-time methodology for HT detection that employs a multi-
parameter statistical traffic modeling of the communication channel
in a given System-on-Chip (SoC). Towards this, it leverages the
Hurst exponent, the standard deviation of the injection distribution
and hop distribution jointly to accurately identify HT-based online
anomalies. At design time, our methodology employs a property
specification language to define and embed assertions in the RTL,
specifying the correct communication behavior of a given SoC. At
runtime, it monitors the anomalies in the communication behavior
by checking the execution patterns against these assertions. We
evaluate our methodology for detecting HTs in MC8051 micro-
controllers. The experimental results show that with the combined
analysis of multiple statistical parameters, our methodology is able
to detect all the benchmark Trojans (available on trust-hub) inserted
in MC8051, which directly or indirectly affect the communication-
channels in SoC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization encourages the use of intellectual property (IP)-
based system-on-chip (SoC) designs. However, this trend in-
creases the chances of malicious hardware design intrusions,
known as Hardware Trojans (HT), into the modern-day SoCs
[1]. Hardware Trojans can lead to several unwanted payloads,
i.e., information leakage, change in the timing characteristics,
malfunctioning and denial-of-service (DoS) [1]. The effects can
be catastrophic, such as system failure and leakage of secret
encryption keys (e.g., failure of ice-detection module in the P-
8A Poseidon [2]), making it imperative to develop effective HT
detection techniques.
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Fig. 1: IC Supply Chain and Targeted Security Vulnerabilities
Some of the contemporary HT detection techniques utilize the
timing [3][4], power [5][6][7], current or electromagnetic signals
based golden signatures to detect anomalous electrical behavior
[8][9]. However, in case of the third-party-IP based designs, it
is nearly impossible to extract the golden signatures. As it may
be apparent, that in most of the 3PIP-based SoCs, the facility to
integrate the IPs can be trusted (as, shown in Fig. 1). On the other
hand, it is difficult to guarantee that the IP vendors can be trusted.
To address this issue, various IP analysis-based approaches have
been proposed to get the golden behavior [10][11][12], [13][14]
but these techniques inherently pose the following limitations:
1) Accuracy of estimated golden behavior: Due to limited access
to IPs, they use different estimation algorithms to extract the
golden model [15]. However, due to measurement inaccu-
racies and behavioral estimation they cannot guarantee the
accuracy of the golden model.
2) In case of reverse engineering, sensors for golden data ex-
traction cannot encompass all the possible input conditions
for larger ICs because of the inherent data loss during the
quantization in analog-to-digital conversion [16].
These limitations raise a key research question: How can
signature-based HT detection techniques effectively work if an
intruder (at foundry) exploits the intricacies of estimation algo-
rithms to insert Trojans that remain dormant during the testing
stages [17]? For example, in an SoC design, some hard or firm
IPs may hide Trojans depending on the aging of the chip [18],
and they only get activated during runtime [19].
To address this issue, several runtime detection approaches have
been developed which can monitor an SoC for its entire op-
erational lifetime, providing an important last-line of defense
[20][21][22][23][24][7][25]. However, most of these techniques
are based on side channel analysis (SCA) which require precise
calibration for differentiating between the process variations
and the intrusion behavior. They also rely on the premise that
triggering of payload results in a substantially higher current flow.
To avoid the complex requirements of the SCA-based runtime
detection HT-techniques, alternative behavior can be used to sniff
the abnormalities during runtime. One of the most prominent ones
is the communication behavior because, in real-world scenarios,
modules are connected via communication channels and therefore
most of the intrusions can have a small or big impact on the com-
munication behavior. To verify aforementioned hypothesis, we
analyze the communication behavior of an MC8051 microcon-
troller for the Gaussian and exponential input data distributions,
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Fig. 2: The effects of trust-hub Trojan benchmarks (i.e., MC8051-T200, T300, T400, T500, T600, T700 and T800) on the
communication behavior of MC8051 for Gaussian and Exponential input data distributions.
in the presence of multiple trust-hub Trojan benchmarks, i.e.,
MC8051-T200, T300, T400, T500, T600, T700 and T800 [26].
Our analysis in Fig. 2 shows that all the benchmarks have some
effects on the communication patterns. For example, MC8051-
T600 slightly changes the communication behavior in case of
exponential distribution. However, in case of Gaussian distribu-
tion it significantly changes the communication behavior of the
microcontroller. In short, this analysis shows that communication
behavior can be monitored to identify abnormalities during run-
time, without estimating the functional behavior of a particular
module.
Associated Research Challenges: Run-time monitoring of the
communication behavior, especially in the complex network-on-
chip (NoC) poses the following research challenges:
1) Modeling of communication behavior: Unlike the side chan-
nel parameters, typical mathematical modeling techniques
cannot be used to model the communication behavior because
of its probabilistic nature. The question arises that how to
model the communication behavior for run-time monitoring
with minimum overhead?
2) Monitoring the communication behavior: How to exploit
the abnormalities in communication behavior to design a run-
time monitoring framework for HT detection?
A. Our Novel Contributions
To address these challenges, we propose a novel methodol-
ogy leveraging the statistical traffic modeling of communication
channels (SIMCom, Section II) in the SoC to sniff the possible
anomalies in 3PIP units. The proposed methodology consists of
the following two major key steps.
1) Statistical modeling of communication behavior (Section
III-A): We propose to model the normal communication
traffic, during the pre-market testing phase of SoC. This
behavior is extracted by obtaining a statistical traffic model,
which is characterized based on the following observations:
a) How often the packets injected in the communication
channel?
b) On average, how far does each packet travel?
c) What portion of the total traffic has been injected in the
communication channel by each module?
2) Run-time monitoring: To design the run-time monitoring
setup, we propose to translate the statistical model of commu-
nication behavior into their corresponding property specifica-
tion language (PSL) assertions (see Sections III-B and III-C
). These assertion are embedded into the RTL description of
SoC along with the traffic monitoring units.
To evaluate the effectiveness of SIMCom, we implemented a
complete SoC with an AMBA bus communication network con-
necting an MC8051 microcontroller and universal asynchronous
receiver/transmitter (UART) modules in VHDL to generate the
pre-market test stage communication behavior. The experimental
results shows that with the help of multiple parameters, SIMCom
is able to detect all MC8051 Trojans which affect the communi-
cation, with the help of these assertions. [26].
B. Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
elaborates the proposed methodology based on the statistical
traffic modeling of SoC communication network for runtime
hardware Trojan detection. For illustration, Section III presents a
case study on the AMBA bus communication network, consisting
of MC8051 microcontroller and UART. Section IV discusses the
detection approaches, attributes, pros and cons of the proposed
approach and compares it with the state-of-the-art techniques.
Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SIMCOM: STATISTICAL SNIFFING OF COMMUNICATION
BEHAVIOR
This section explains our proposed methodology for runtime
hardware Trojan detection based on the traffic modeling of SoC
communication. Using an appropriate threat model is one of
the foremost steps in developing any methodology for detecting
intrusions in the domain of hardware security. In this paper, we
assume that 3PIP vendors are not trusted and the SoC integration
is performed in a trusted facility [27].
A. SIMCom Methodology
The proposed methodology consists of two major steps as
depicted by the dotted rectangles in Fig. 3.
Extract the statistical communication traffic model behavior
PSL 1: assert always (H[1:100000] == H_design);  PSL 2: assert always (sigma[1:100000] == sigma_design);  
PSL 3: assert always (P[1:100000] <= Pmax && P[1:100000] >= Pmin)
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Fig. 3: SIMCom: Statistical sniffing of inter-module communication for runtime HT detection
of an SoC during the pre-market test stage: The traffic
modeling [28] is done under the premise is that no Trojans
get activated during the pre-market test phase. The statistical
communication behavior of an SoC can be obtained by utilizing
the following steps:
1) The input packets are generated with respect to the standard
spatial injection distribution, e.g., Gaussian distribution.
2) Next, Hurst exponent, at the pre-market test stage, is com-
puted for each communication channel, using the estimation
algorithm, given in Algorithm 1. This step is further explained
in Section III-A.
3) Then, the extracted traffic model is translated to its corre-
sponding PSL assertions.
4) Finally, the traffic monitoring unit for run-time HT detection
is designed. This is achieved by counting the packets for a
specific duration and computing the Hurst exponent at run
time.
Run-time Hardware Trojan Detection: The next step of the
proposed methodology is to monitor the run-time traffic of an
SoC and to compare it with the extracted pre-market test stage
behavior. This step is composed of the following sub-steps:
1) First, the Hurst exponent (H), probability of hop distribution
(P ) and standard deviation of input injection distribution (σ)
parameters are computed for each communication channel
during runtime. Moreover, Algorithm 1 (explained in Section
III-A) is used to extract the “H” exponent of the statistical
communication behavior during runtime.
2) Then, the extracted statistical communication behavior is
verified using the embedded PSL assertions.
III. A CASE STUDY:AN SOC WITH AMBA BUS CONNECTING
AN MC8051 MICROCONTROLLER AND A UART MODULE.
In this section, we illustrate the effectiveness of SIMCom by
applying it on on an SoC with AMBA bus connecting an MC8051
microcontroller and a UART module, as shown in Fig. 4.
Trojan Benchmark Circuit: 
MC8051-T200, T300, T400, 
T500, T600, T700, T800
Input Packet distribution: 
Gaussian and Exponential 
MC8051 MC8051 MC8051 MC8051
SLAVE UART SLAVE SLAVE
SLAVE SLAVE UART SLAVE
AMBA 2.0
MC8051
MC8051
Injection Distributions
Fig. 4: Case Study overview: MC8051-based UART Communi-
cation Network (blue and red text represent the un-intruded and
intruded modules, respectively. )
This experimental setup consists of four MC8051 Master mod-
ules, which can initiate the communication with the eight slave
modules along with two UART modules. The main motivation
of choosing the MC8051 microcontroller as our case study
is the availability of its ope-source Trojan benchmarks at the
trusthub.org [26]. We first obtained the communication behavior
of the un-intruded MC8051 while communicating with UART
modules. We used this behavior to obtain the corresponding PSL
assertions and embed them into the SoC. The key assumption of
the experimental setup is that Though all instances of the MC8051
can have the Trojan but Trojan in only one IP module is triggered
at a particular time considering a unique sequence happening at
run time with very low probability of triggering (almost zero).
A. Pre-Market Test Stage Traffic Model of MC8051
For obtaining this behavior, we implemented the MC8051
microcontroller in VHDL and synthesized it for Spartan 6
(xc6slx45)1 FPGA device . The communication behavior is ex-
tracted by measuring the number of packets for specific duration
and computing the required traffic model parameters, H , P and
σ. This phase of our methodology is divided into the following
steps:
1) The first step is to extract the communication model. We
developed the model by injecting the packets using the
Gausian distribution, as shown in Fig. 4. This probability
distribution not only reflects the actual traffic very well, but
it also incorporates the environmental and process variations
[29]. In our experimental setup, all the master modules, i.e.,
MC8051s, inject packets into the SoC. The value of σ of
MC8051 for the first 10,000 clock cycles is kept as 18.844
and maintained it over the 100,000 clock cycles, as shown in
Fig. 5b. Its average value over the 100,000 clock cycles is
mentioned in column “σ” under “T000 (Without Trojan)” of
Table I.
2) Afterwards we need to identify the number of modules that
a particular master can access through the bus. In this case
study, we assume that every MC8051 can communicate with
all the slave modules (n = 8). However, for some specific
instruction sets, MC8051 does not communicate with all the
slave modules. For example, the instructions that requires the
UART communication module only. In our setup, there are
only “two” slaves that are using the UART communication
modules. Therefore, the acceptance probability (p) for this
case study must be greater than 0.125 as shown in Fig. 5. Its
average value over the 100,000 clock cycles is indicated in
column “P ” under “T000 (Without Trojan)” of Table I.
3) The last step in obtaining the communication model is to
estimate the Hurst exponent for MC8051. For this, we have
developed Algorithm 1, which counts the number of packet
for a specific duration and estimates the Hurst exponent (H).
In Algorithm 1, a counter (np), is used to count the number of
packets for a specific bin size; for this case study its value is
100 clock cycles. The counting is done 100 times to find the
maximum (npmax) and minimum (npmin) number of packets
in 100 clock cycles. However, for larger number of clock
cycles, the memory requirement for storing these parameters
is very high. Therefore, to reduce the memory requirement,
we divided the whole duration into 100 equal parts. For
example in Algorithm 1, the total time duration is 10,000
clock cycles and we divided into 100 smaller time duration.
For each duration, the number of packets is calculated, which
is stored in a variable array np[0 : 99] to compute its overall
range (npmax−npmin) and average (np0 + np1 + ..+ np99
100
).
Finally, the Hurst exponent is computed by averaging out the
obtained values. We repeated these steps for 10 times, i.e.
the 10,000 clock cycles data is stored in one array and then
the whole process is repeated 9 times to get an overall H
exponent for 100,000 clock cycles. This value is tabulated as
0.692 in the column “H” under “T000” (without Trojan) of
Table I.
1Since the overall SoC fits into this small FPGA, there was no need to use a
bigger FPGA chip. We target a low-cost SoC, for which Spartan 6 suffices the
need.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of Hurst Exponent Estimation
Input:
bsize: Minimum Number of Clock Cycles (Bin Size)
maxclk: Maximum Number of Clock Cycles
np: Number of packet per bin; np[0 : 99]: Number of packet per bin
H: Hurst Exponent; H[0 : 99]: Hurst parameter array
Initialize:
binsize: 99; maxsize: 99; npackets: 0; i: 0; j: 0;k: 0;
1: while k ≤ 10 do
2: while i ≤ maxclk do
3: while j ≤ bsize do
4: j = j + 1 @ posedge clock; np = np+ 1 @ each packet
5: end while
6: np[i] = np; i = i+ 1
7: if np[i] ≥ np[i− 1] then
8: npmax = np[i] //Maximum number of packets per Bin
9: else
10: npmax = np[i− 1]
11: end if
12: if np[i] ≤ np[i− 1] then
13: npmin = np[i] //Minimum number of packets per Bin
14: else
15: npmax = np[i− 1]
16: end if
17: nptotal = np[i] + np[i+ 1]; j = 0
18: end while
19: npaverage = npmax/i
20: H[k] = log10(npmax−npmin)/(npaverage×log10(maxclk.bsize))
21: i = 0; Htotal = H[k] +H[k − 1]
22: end while
23: H = Htotal/k
B. Translation into PSL Assertions
We analyzed the extracted pre-market test stage communica-
tion model of the AMBA bus, and translated it into the following
PSL assertions based on the traffic model parameters, H , P and
σ:
1) P Assertion: It states that, over the specific number of clock
cycles, the acceptance probability (P ) for a particular module
must be equal to the value of acceptance probability (P ) to
the obtained communication behavior, as shown in Assertion
I.
always (P[1:100K] == P_design) (I)
Moreover, the acceptance probability (P ) for a particular ar-
chitecture must be within the prescribed limits. The maximum
and the minimum values of P are obtained as (Pmax =
1
n− 1 ) and (Pmin =
1
r − 1 ), respectively, where n and
r represent the number of modules that each module can
communicate with, and the number of modules that a par-
ticular instruction set/application need to communicate with,
respectively. This is elaborated in Assertion II:
always (P[1:100K] <= Pmax && P[1:100K] >= Pmin)
(II)
2) σ Assertion: This assertion states that over the specific number
of clock cycles, the value of σ for a particular module must
be equal to the value of σ from the pre-market test stage
communication behavior, as shown in Assertion III.
always (sigma[1:100K]== sigma_design)
(III)
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3) H Assertion: This assertion ensures that over a specific number
of clock cycles, the Hurst exponent (H) for a particular
module must be equal to value of H obtained at pre-market
test stage.
always (H[1:100K]== H_design) (IV)
In order to incorporate the environmental changes and process
variation, we introduce the 5% variation cap on the H , P , σ.
C. Run-time Detection and Validation
The last step of the proposed methodology is to embed the
translated assertions along with the H , P and σ estimation
blocks into the SoC.To illustrate the proposed methodology, we
validated it with the MC8051 benchmarks intrusions, available
online at trust-hub.org [26]. These intrusions affect different types
of communication behavior. Some of them affect the UART
communication, other affect the jump based instruction and some
intrusions affect the ALU operations, Table I shows the effects
of these Trojans. Each row in Table I represents the benchmark
Trojans, and the columns describe their effects on different oper-
ations. We validated the proposed methodology for the intrusions
T300 to T800, because these are all the intrusions that can directly
TABLE I: Effects of the trust-hub Trojan benchmarks on different
modules of MC8051 and corresponding statistical modeling. ×
and X shows that Trojan either affect or does not affect a
particular functionality.
Trojans UART JumpDisabling
ALU
Operations (H ,σ,P )
T000 – – – (0.694,18.844, 0.252)
T200 – – – –
T300 X × X (0,0,0)
T400 × × X (0.704,14.617, 0.252)
T500 X × X (0.701,15.019, 0.252)
T600 X X X (0.644,14.472, 0.252)
T700 X × × (0.672,14.728, 0.252)
T800 X × × (0.639,14.476, 0.252)
or indirectly affect the communication of MC8051 among the set
of the benchmark Trojans. To evaluate the consistency checking
of SIMCom, we analyzed the runitme and average statistical
behavior for the experimental setup.
1) Run-time Impact Analysis: To elaborate the practicality
of SIMCom, we have computed the statistical communication
behavior of the case study for 100,000 clock cycles, as shown
in Fig. 5. The figure depicts the communication behavior with
respect to H , σ and P . This run-time analysis exhibits the
following key observations:
1 Hurst Exponent: The Trojan benchmarks have a significant
impact on the Hurst Exponent but that impact is dependent on
the input data distribution (i.e., Gaussian or Exponential). For
instance, in Fig. 5, if the input data distribution is Gaussian,
then few of the implemented Trojan benchmarks (i.e., MS8051-
T400, T500, and T700) have a significant impact on the
Hurst exponent (see: label 1). However, if the input data
distribution is exponential, then almost all the HTs have shown
the significant impact on the Hurst exponent (see: label 2).
2 Probability of Hop Distribution: All the implemented Tro-
jans have no impact on the probability of hop distribution,
except the MC8051-T300 because when it is triggered, it halts
a communication channel, as shown in Fig. 5 (see: labels 3
and 4).
3 Standard Deviation of Injection Distribution: All the im-
plemented Trojans deviates from the original values because
all of them affect the input data injection, as shown in Fig. 5.
For instance, MS8051-T500 and T700 replace the valid data
with intruded data. However, MC8051-T400 disables interrupt
handling, T600 interrupts the jump and T800 manipulates
the stack pointer, which indirectly disrupt the input data or
respective control modules.
The values of H and σ for MC8051-T300 are “0” because when
T300 is triggered, it blocks the UART communication altogether,
hence no data traffic flows at all, resulting in the corresponding
’0’ values for H and sigma.
2) Average Impact Analysis: In order to elaborate the consis-
tency of SIMCom, we have analyzed the average communication
behavior of the MC8051-based UART communication network,
as shown in Fig. 6 which depicts the communication behavior
with respect to H , σ and P . This analysis exhibits the following
key observations:
1 Hurst Exponent: The average behavior of proposed statistical
model shows that, on the average, all the implemented Trojan
benchmarks have a significant impact on the H irrespective
of the input data distributions, as shown in Fig. 6. However,
the value of H for MC8051-T300 is “0”. Hence, this can
be considered as the weakest Trojan for the communication-
aware HT detection (see: label A and D). Though it shows
that run-time impact of implemented Trojans is more in case
of the exponential distribution, in average analysis, this impact
is less as compared to the impact on the Gaussian distribution.
The reason behind this behavior is that, in the exponential
distribution, over the period of time the data rate decreases
exponentially.
2 Probability of Hop Distribution: Even in the average-case
analysis, all the implemented Trojans have no any impact on
the probability of hop distribution, except for the MC8051-
T300 as shown in Fig. 6 (see: labels D and E). The reason
behind this behavior is that, when this Trojan benchmark gets
an activation trigger, it blocks the communication of a channel.
3 Standard Deviation of Injection Distribution: All the imple-
mented Trojans deviates from the original values because all of
them affect the input data injection, except the MC8051-T300,
as shown in Fig. 6 (see: labels C and F). For instance, MS8051-
T500 and T700 replace the valid data with the intruded data.
However, the MC8051-T400 disables interrupt handling, the
T600 interrupts the jump and the T800 manipulates the stack
pointer, which indirectly disrupt the input data or respective
control modules.
IV. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNIQUES
Table II provides a comparison of SIMCom with the state-
of-the-art techniques that are relevant. This comparative analysis
based on five parameters. Overhead provides the count of the
extra component requirement for run-tim HT detection. The col-
umn, Detection Approaches, describes how a particular technique
is detecting or protecting the intrusions that have any effect on
SoC communication. The fourth column, Attributes, indicates
the key parameters used by a technique to protect or detect the
intrusions. The final two comparison parameters describe the Pros
and Cons of a particular technique. The proposed technique is
found out to be better than other state-of-the-art techniques in the
following ways:
1) The proposed technique does not require any wrappers and
hidden control signals, like the LOCK signal, for protecting
against the Trojans, as some other techniques require, e.g.,
[30].
2) Unlike [31], [32], our technique does not presume that Trojan
pay load activation provides a very high change in the commu-
nication channel or any change in communication protocols.
Moreover, it can also detect the Trojans which have indirect
effects on communication channels
3) Area overhead of the proposed technique is less than the tech-
niques, presented in [31], [32], as they embed the complete
trained ML model in SoC and is comparable to the technique
presented in [30].
4) The proposed technique can be used for any known bus
system by adding the H , P and σ measurement blocks
and PSL assertions obtained from the pre-market test stage
communication behavior.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper utilizes a statistical traffic modeling of SoC for
sniffing hardware Trojans during runtime. The proposed method-
ology consists of two major steps: The first step is to extract
the pre-market test stage traffic model by computing the three
parameters, i.e., Hurst exponent (H), spatial hop distribution
(P ) and spatial injection distribution (σ). Then, this extracted
behavior is translated to its corresponding PSL assertions, which
are embedded into the given SoC along with the blocks which
compute the traffic modeling parameters. For illustration purpose,
we implemented the un-intruded AMBA bus based SoC consist-
ing of MC8051 and UART in VHDL to extract the pre-market test
stage communication behavior. For validation purposes, we used
the benchmark intrusions of MC8051. The experimental results
show that the proposed methodology is able to detect all MC8051
intrusions that have either direct or indirect effect on the SoC
communication network. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first time the statistical sniffing of SoC’s communication traffic
is utilized to detect hardware Trojans in 3PIP modules.
TABLE II: Comparative discussion with the state-of-the-art Techniques
Techniques Run-timeOverhead
Detection
Approaches Attributes Pros Cons
Kim et al.
[30]
MUX based
Wrappers,
Registers
Protecting
Wrappers,
Hidden Signals
i.e., LOCK
Master ID,
Restricted Addressing,
Ready and Grant Signals
1. Low On-chip area overhead
2. Tolerant to the SoC bus
intrusions
1. Only applicable if the SoC
utilized the communication network
without affecting protocol, then it fails.
Kulkarni et al.
[31], [32]
Trained
ML Model
ML Tools
i.e., k-NN,
MBW, SVM
Source and Destination Core,
Packet Transfer Path, Distance 1. Faster detection time.
1. Cannot detect Trojans if the IPs
are intruded.
2. Only applicable if intrusion aff-
ects the communication protocols
SIMCom
H , P and σ
computing Blocks,
Four 3.2KB
Memories
Communication
based PSL
Assertions
Hurst exponent (H),
Hop Distribution (P ),
Standard Deviation of
Injection Distribution (σ)
1. Detect the Trojans in 3PIP modules
that use SoC communication network
2. it is able to detect Trojans, which do not
affect the protocol directly.
1. Only applicable if intrusion
affects the SoC communication
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